




EMERGENCY SITUATION ASSESSMENT

EASTERN SYRIA FLASH FLOODS

Humanitarian impact, damaged infrastructure and access constraints

27-29 OCTOBER 2026



375

FAMILIES DEPARTED CAMPS

7

CROSSINGS / TRACKS OFFLINE

165

FIELD RESPONSES

PREPARED BY

EMISSA | Field Monitoring & Assessment Unit

Coverage: Ar-Raqqa · Deir ez-Zor · Al-Hasakah · Eastern Homs / Palmyra / Badia

Executive summary

Between 27 and 29 October 2026, an intense storm system generated heavy convective rainfall, surface-water accumulation and rapid runoff through seasonal watercourses across eastern and central Syria. The principal humanitarian consequences were acute exposure at road and wadi crossings, displacement from low-lying camps in Ar-Raqqa, damage to bridges and culverts, interruption of transport links, and water intrusion into homes and essential facilities. Conditions in Palmyra and the Syrian Badia differed from urban flooding: concentrated runoff crossed desert roads and created life-threatening hazards where dry wadis intersect critical transport corridors.

The consolidated emergency snapshot available on 29 October recorded 165 field interventions across six governorates by 23:30 on 28 October, more than 350 incident reports, 15 people rescued from flood-trapped vehicles, approximately 375 families moving out of affected camps in Ar-Raqqa, and seven bridges, culverts or earthen roads out of service. Responders also drained floodwater from more than 150 homes and public facilities nationally. A separate Ar-Raqqa directorate tally recorded response at 105 homes across four localities. These figures represent different reporting units and should not be added together.

Nationwide emergency-response snapshot




Figure 1. Consolidated emergency indicators; each metric has a different unit or geographic coverage and is presented independently.

Central finding The most urgent common need is safe access: restoring protected movement between settlements, health facilities and markets while assisting displaced camp households and controlling further wadi-crossing exposure.

Assessment coverage and interpretation

This EMISSA field-monitoring assessment presents an incident-based rapid humanitarian analysis for operational planning. It combines consolidated emergency situation figures, locality-level incident information and the organization's technical interpretation of protection, shelter, WASH, livelihood and access implications. Site-specific structural damage, agricultural area losses, household-level needs and flood footprints are not assigned numerical values where the reporting record does not establish a reliable measurement.

1 Storm evolution and geographic footprint


1.1 Event sequence

Period	Development	Humanitarian implication
27 October	Severe-weather alerts and preparatory warnings preceded the strongest rainfall.	Low-lying settlements and desert routes were at heightened exposure.
28 October afternoon and evening	Heavy thunderstorms, hail, strong winds and rapid wadi runoff affected Ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah, eastern Homs, Hama and Aleppo.	Flooded roads, inundation of homes and drainage overload triggered emergency calls.
28 October late evening	Emergency teams mobilized rescue and pumping operations; floodwater compromised several crossings.	Transport and medical access deteriorated at key bridge approaches.
29 October early morning	Consolidated national response figures were issued; additional rescue operations continued in rural Ar-Raqqa.	Evacuation, safe access and essential services remained priority requirements.

1.2 Hazard mechanism

Flash flooding resulted from intense rain falling over relatively short periods, producing runoff that exceeded local infiltration and drainage capacity. In dry valleys, rainfall may have occurred upstream of the affected road crossing and arrived as a fast-moving front with limited visible warning. Desert tracks, low-water crossings, culvert inlets and bridge approach embankments are especially exposed to scour, blockage and overtopping. In settlements, inadequate stormwater disposal, accumulated debris and low-level building entrances converted surface runoff into direct shelter and service disruption.

Eastern Syria | indicative locality and corridor overview




Map 1. Geographic reference overview of localities and strategic corridors discussed in this assessment. Markers identify approximate locations, not verified floodwater boundaries.

2 Ar-Raqqa: population displacement and urban impact

2.1 Evacuation from three camps

Emergency authorities recorded 375 families departing three affected camps in rural Ar-Raqqa after floodwater reached their sites. Sahl al-Banat accounted for 200 families (53.3% of the recorded departures), Al-Younani for 100 (26.7%) and Al-Maqas for 75 (20.0%). These figures describe reported departures rather than the number of totally destroyed tents; a reliable shelter-damage inventory by tent type was not established in the available consolidated record. Exposure pathways include waterlogging of sleeping areas, loss of dry storage, poor access to latrines and contamination of household water containers.



Official Raqqa emergency figures, 29 October 2026; counts describe camp movements, not damaged shelters.

Figure 2. Camp family movements reported by the Ar-Raqqa Emergency and Disaster Management Directorate, 29 October 2026.

2.2 Households, villages and immediate services

A Raqqa directorate response tally documented 105 homes addressed: 50 in Ar-Raqqa city, 30 in Tabqa, 15 in Tall Abyad and 10 in Al-Mansurah. These cases should not be treated as a full damage census. Separately, failure of an earthen culvert at Kasrat Surur exposed more than 100 families to floodwater and prompted urgent assistance. At Fattayih in western rural Raqqa, water surrounded homes, affecting local movement and access. The distinction between flooded, structurally damaged and temporarily inaccessible homes remains important for targeting appropriate shelter support.

105 homes included in the Raqqa response record




Figure 3. Homes included in the early Raqqa incident-response count by locality. This is not a province-wide housing damage estimate.

3 Ar-Raqqa: bridges, roads and essential services

3.1 Critical highway interruption

Floodwater severed the Aleppo–Ar-Raqqa highway at Al-Salmani Bridge, west of Tabqa, along the western Raqqa approach. The crossing became a major safety and logistics bottleneck, preventing ordinary road use and disrupting ambulance and passenger journeys. Medical responders around the Tabqa system mobilized to manage casualties and assisted two women swept by floodwater. One death was reported in the western Raqqa area. Early accounts also described missing persons; the status of each search case requires case-specific closure and is not converted here into a final fatality count.

3.2 Additional damaged crossings

Al-Kantari Bridge sustained severe reported damage, while Ratlah Bridge was reported partially damaged and subsequently subject to engineering intervention to secure access. An earthen culvert or crossing at Kasrat Surur failed, creating localized isolation and direct household exposure. Reports sometimes used “collapse,” “damage” and “out of service” differently across these locations. Consequently, this assessment retains the operational effect and does not infer complete structural collapse unless explicitly supported by the incident description.

Crossing / road	Incident effect	Immediate implication
Al-Salmani Bridge / Aleppo–Raqqa road	Highway severed by floodwater; major crossing damage.	Urgent closure management, alternate ambulance route and structural safety assessment.
Al-Kantari Bridge	Severe damage reported during storm runoff.	Engineering restriction and safe detour; inspect supports and approaches.
Ratlah Bridge	Partial damage / affected approaches; emergency works deployed.	Controlled access only after technical clearance.
Kasrat Surur earthen culvert	Collapse/failure with floodwater affecting >100 families.	Rescue access, household assistance and reconstruction of drainage capacity.
Raqqa–Deir ez-Zor corridor	Closure reported during the emergency phase.	Severe inter-governorate supply and patient-transfer exposure.

3.3 Public facilities and urban drainage

Municipal workshops and civil defence teams pumped stormwater from urban streets and public premises, including the ground floor of Hayat Hospital in Ar-Raqqa. Drainage inflow exceeded the capacity of some stormwater outlets, making blockage removal, pump deployment and access control immediate priorities. Electricity supply was temporarily interrupted at transformation stations as a safety measure. Education services were suspended on 29 October in affected eastern governorates as a precaution against unsafe travel and severe weather.

4 Deir ez-Zor: wadi bridges and disruption of services

4.1 Geographic concentration of reported damage

The Deir ez-Zor Emergency and Disaster Management Directorate identified several locations where storm runoff affected infrastructure: Al-Kabr Bridge in the Al-Jazrat area, Al-Tarif Bridge, Khan al-Zahra and Al-Shiha Bridge in the Al-Tibni sector. The national emergency summary stated that three bridges built over wadis in the governorate or its countryside went out of service. Because a named-location list does not necessarily match the national count one-to-one, this report does not automatically classify every named site as a separate destroyed bridge.

Within urban Deir ez-Zor, water entered streets, some residences and public spaces. Teams cleared blocked culverts, opened stormwater channels and pumped accumulated water. The combination of clogged drainage and low-lying streets caused mobility disruption even where roads and bridges were not structurally lost.

4.2 Ferry and floating-bridge restrictions

Local emergency authorities suspended the use of floating crossings in Deir ez-Zor and Al-Mayadin during the severe-weather period. This was reported as a precautionary safety measure; it should not be presented as evidence that every floating bridge physically collapsed. The measure affected links between riverbanks and increased reliance on longer road connections, potentially complicating market access, clinic referrals, agricultural transport and school travel.

4.3 Drinking water and electricity

Water-pumping services in western rural Deir ez-Zor were reported suspended due to increased turbidity after the storm. Short interruptions can have disproportionate consequences for settlements with limited household storage and constrained tanker alternatives. In Marat, strong winds and contact between low-voltage lines caused an outage in Al-Sabaa neighbourhood and adjacent areas. These events indicate parallel but distinct hazards: flood sediment affecting treatment and pumping, and wind-related faults affecting electricity distribution.

Response priority Inspect the three confirmed out-of-service wadi bridges; coordinate safe crossing arrangements; restore water treatment and pumping after appropriate checks; and clear urban culverts ahead of further rainfall.

5 Palmyra and the Syrian Badia: flash-flood corridor assessment

5.1 Why the Badia requires a separate risk approach

The Syrian Badia is characterised by long transport distances, sparse services and dry watercourses that can convey fast runoff with little warning. Rainfall in a distant catchment can produce dangerous floodwater at a road crossing even when the immediate area is dry. Road shoulders and unprotected earth approaches may be undermined below the paved surface, creating hazards that are difficult for drivers to identify. The operational consequences extend beyond a single blocked route: stranded travellers, interrupted commercial transport, delayed medical evacuation and loss of access for pastoral households.

5.2 Al-Furqlus–Palmyra road

On 28 October, powerful flash floods crossed and inundated sections of the Al-Furqlus–Palmyra road in eastern rural Homs, temporarily disrupting vehicle movement. Video and locality descriptions documented a stranded vehicle on the route and substantial water and mud accumulation. The present information establishes dangerous overtopping and traffic interruption but does not establish a measured length of road destruction or a verified reconstruction cost. Any statement that the entire highway was washed away would overstate the available structural evidence.

5.3 Al-Qusayrat–Palmyra closure and alternative routing

Civil Defence reported that the Al-Qusayrat–Palmyra road was closed because of flash floods and indicated an alternative through Al-Fosfat / Al-Barada towards As-Suwana and Palmyra. This directional advice was an emergency measure rather than a guarantee of safe passage on every secondary segment. All travel on alternative routes remains contingent on the latest road-control information, visibility and local engineering inspection.

5.4 Wadi Hanoura and the Al-Tayfur (T4) area

A vehicle and its passengers were reported swept away by floodwater in Wadi Hanoura, east of the Al-Tayfur (T4) sector. This incident illustrates the sudden force of concentrated wadi flow at exposed crossings and the risk of attempting passage even in a capable vehicle. Search-and-rescue operations require specialised teams, controlled access and coordination with police and road authorities. The incident should not be used to infer a verified casualty total without a confirmed rescue outcome.

Critical access principle A flood-affected desert route may remain unsafe after surface water recedes. Subsurface erosion, blocked culverts and unstable shoulders require inspection before reopening.

6 Badia exposure beyond Palmyra

6.1 Al-Sukhnah and eastern Homs corridors

Al-Sukhnah is a strategic intermediate point on the Palmyra–Deir ez-Zor overland axis. It belongs within the operational monitoring geography because nearby wadi intersections and low-lying access tracks may threaten supply and evacuation movements. As of this assessment, no reliable count of destroyed houses, damaged kilometres or displaced residents within Al-Sukhnah itself was available for attribution to the October storm. The location is therefore treated as a corridor-level priority rather than a site with a quantified loss.

6.2 Rasafa / southern Raqqa Badia

On 29 October, rescue teams assisted three people in the Rasafa desert sector of southern Raqqa after two lost communication and a third became disoriented during the floods. These cases demonstrate that humanitarian exposure in the Badia includes wayfinding, communication and loss of safe routes, not only visible property damage. Emergency notification arrangements must cover remote pastoral users and commercial drivers who may operate outside town-based warning networks.

6.3 Al-Bukamal Badia and Wadi Al-Sawab

Emergency authorities warned residents and pastoralists in Al-Bukamal and its Badia, particularly those near Wadi Al-Sawab and its tributaries, to evacuate tents and agricultural sites near the wadi and move livestock to elevated ground. The warning reflected a potential downstream flood surge from the Badia. This is a documented precautionary risk area, not proof that all structures along Wadi Al-Sawab were inundated. Emergency preparedness and safe-site relocation should be distinguished from recorded damage.

6.4 Consequences for pastoral livelihoods

High-velocity runoff can isolate herds, destroy fodder stores, obstruct access to water points and affect seasonal grazing mobility. The principal response is to protect people and remaining livestock first, then undertake locality-level checks on herd losses, veterinary access and damaged water systems. No aggregate livestock mortality or crop-area loss is inserted in this assessment because the October incident figures do not substantiate such estimates.



Figure 4. Distinct exposure patterns across the October flash-flood footprint. The cards classify reported effects and operational risks, not a comparative severity ranking.

7 Al-Hasakah, eastern Aleppo and eastern Hama

7.1 Al-Hasakah / Ras al-Ayn

Strong rainfall affected parts of Al-Hasakah governorate. In Ras al-Ayn, emergency crews cleared culverts and drainage channels to reduce urban water accumulation. Reports identified drainage pressure and risks for displaced residents in poorly drained sites, but the available consolidated statistics do not support a governorate-level total for flooded shelters or displaced families. Priority measures are drainage maintenance, site-level safety checks and emergency access to health and essential services.

7.2 Eastern Aleppo and connected transport corridors

Rainfall and strong winds generated local flooding and road interruption in Aleppo governorate, which formed part of the broader six-governorate emergency response. The Aleppo–Raqqa route became especially important because the Al-Salmani interruption was located on a major intercity approach, affecting movement across administrative boundaries. A route may remain inaccessible even if its most visible damage lies outside the traveller's home governorate; road-access analysis must therefore be corridor-based rather than solely district-based.

7.3 Eastern Hama and Aqirbat

Floodwater was observed in eastern Hama, including the Aqirbat area, during the same storm system. In such open-country settings, seasonal channels may isolate settlements and agricultural tracks. A numerical count of damaged roads or shelters in Aqirbat could not be established from the incident figures used for this report; the area is included as an affected hazard zone requiring route-specific assessment, not a quantified damage hotspot.

7.4 Cross-border mobility and protection

Disruption of main corridors affects returnees, displaced households and transit populations who rely on intercity buses or privately arranged transport. In rural sites with few alternative routes, access difficulties can delay access to medication, official documentation services, food markets and work. Coordinated travel information should therefore be accessible through local councils, transport operators, health providers and community focal points, with specific attention to persons with disabilities and older people.

8 Detailed road and bridge damage register

The following matrix distinguishes operational closure, documented structural damage and proactive restrictions. It is deliberately not a current traffic bulletin; access status changes as engineering teams clear debris and reopen routes.

Governorate / location	Asset or corridor	Reported condition / event	Priority consequence
Ar-Raqqa	Al-Salmani / Aleppo–Raqqqa	Crossing damaged; highway cut by floodwater.	Critical intercity access and referral disruption.
Ar-Raqqa	Al-Kantari Bridge	Major damage reported.	Structural inspection and detour management.
Ar-Raqqa	Ratlah Bridge	Partial damage; securing and opening work.	Approach safety and controlled reinstatement.
Ar-Raqqa	Kasrat Surur earth crossing	Culvert / earth crossing collapsed.	Exposure of >100 families and reduced local access.
Ar-Raqqa	Raqqqa–Deir ez-Zor road	Emergency road closure reported.	Supply and commercial transport interruption.
Deir ez-Zor	Al-Kabr / Al-Jazrat Bridge	Reported affected wadi crossing.	Local access and culvert inspection.
Deir ez-Zor	Al-Tarif Bridge	Damage reported.	Crossing safety and road diversions.
Deir ez-Zor	Al-Shiha / Al-Tibni Bridge	Storm damage reported.	Village-to-service connectivity.
Deir ez-Zor	Khan al-Zahra area	Flooding / infrastructure impact.	Local drainage and road access.
Deir ez-Zor	Deir ez-Zor / Al-Mayadin floats	Operations suspended as precaution.	Cross-river movement restrictions.
Eastern Homs	Al-Furqlus–Palmyra	Floodwater over road; mobility disrupted.	High risk to motorists on wadi sections.
Eastern Homs	Al-Qusayrat–Palmyra	Closure with alternative route advised.	Isolation / journey diversion.
Eastern Homs	Wadi Hanoura / T4	Vehicle reportedly swept away.	Immediate life-safety and rescue priority.
Badia / Ar-Raqqa	Rasafa desert routes	Travellers rescued or assisted.	Remote communications and access exposure.

Interpretation The national count of seven out-of-service bridges / culverts / dirt roads is a mixed category and is not a count of permanently destroyed bridges. Locality reports may describe the same assets as the national aggregate.

9 Humanitarian needs and sectoral implications

9.1 Shelter, displacement and NFIs

Flood-affected camp households may require dry overnight accommodation, mattresses and blankets, clothing, hygiene materials, cooking supplies and transport assistance. Shelter priorities should be based on current habitability, not only on whether water touched the dwelling. Where hosting by relatives is possible, host families may also face increased water, food and sanitation demand. Site planning must identify accessible routes, safe lighting and separated facilities appropriate to protection considerations.

9.2 Water, sanitation and hygiene

Floodwater passing through settlements can enter household containers, latrines, drains and low-level pump housings. Water should not be assumed safe solely because mains supply has resumed; turbidity, chlorination and distribution continuity need operational checks. In congested sites, priority is safe drinking water, basic excreta disposal, cleaning of occupied spaces and timely health messaging. Damaged or blocked culverts create recurrent exposure if debris is removed without an adequate discharge route.

9.3 Health, MHPSS and referrals

The immediate health profile includes trauma and drowning risk at crossings, minor injuries from debris, hypothermia or exposure among those evacuated at night, and interruption of regular treatment when ambulances cannot traverse bridges. Children who experienced sudden displacement may show distress and require structured reassurance and safe recreational environments. Referral services should communicate viable routes and avoid dispatching vehicles toward uncleared crossings.

9.4 Food security, markets and livelihoods

Damage to roads can interrupt the movement of bread, fresh foods, fuel, livestock feed and household goods. Rural producers may lose sales even where crops remain intact because access to markets is blocked. Pastoralists face a distinct risk of stranded animals and fodder loss. Early support should combine emergency food or cash where markets function with rapid restoration of economically important feeder roads and targeted recovery grants linked to documented losses.

10 Protection, inclusion and the risk of secondary harm

10.1 Risks by population group

Population group	Likely emergency constraint	Required response safeguard
Displaced camp families	Loss of dry sleeping areas, wet assets, dependence on temporary hosting.	Accessible shelter, clearly explained assistance criteria, restoration of privacy.
Children and adolescents	Unsupervised exposure to floodwater, school closure, acute distress.	Family tracing when needed; child-safe access and psychosocial support.
Older persons / persons with disabilities	Mobility restrictions, difficulty evacuating or standing in assistance queues.	Door-to-door checks, accessible vehicles, priority queues and assisted referrals.
Women and girls	Privacy loss, safety risks in crowded shelters, limited access to menstrual materials.	Separate well-lit sanitation, dignity materials and confidential referral channels.
Pastoralists and remote travellers	No warning signal, poor network connectivity, wadi crossing exposure.	Offline alerts, community focal points and safe-route communication.

10.2 Accountability and information provision

Emergency messages should state which routes are officially restricted and the conditions under which reopening is authorised. Risk information must be provided in accessible channels for people with limited literacy, disabilities or intermittent internet coverage. Registrations should avoid collecting unnecessary sensitive information and should not make aid conditional on evidence that a family cannot safely retrieve from a flooded home. Complaint and feedback options should operate in private, without requiring families to disclose protection concerns publicly.

10.3 Environmental and unexploded ordnance risks

Flash floods can shift debris and expose unstable excavations along roads. In areas affected by conflict, erosion may uncover or displace unexploded ordnance; therefore no clearance of suspect objects or entry to abandoned military areas should be undertaken by untrained responders. Any suspected contamination calls for cordoning, community warnings and referral to qualified mine-action operators. Solid-waste removal and silt clearance should also account for contaminated sludge and damaged electrical systems.

11 Priority response framework

Phase	Priority actions	Operational outcome
0–72 hours	Identify blocked crossings; support official closures; maintain search-and-rescue readiness and medical dispatch routes.	Avoid additional flood-crossing casualties and maintain life-saving referrals.
0–72 hours	Assist displaced camp families with safe accommodation, drinking water, shelter essentials, privacy and hygiene.	Stabilise immediate needs among the 375 reported families and vulnerable hosts.
Days 3–14	Engineer-led assessment of the Ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor bridge inventory; safe culvert clearance and controlled road reopening.	Restore critical links without reopening structurally unsafe sections.
Days 3–14	Restore safe water pumping and drainage at public facilities, settlements and health centres.	Reduce water-access disruptions and recurrent standing-water exposure.
Weeks 3–12	Repair priority road shoulders, earth embankments, culverts and feeder approaches using flood-resilient dimensions.	Improve reliability of emergency and market access during repeat storms.
Weeks 3–12	Assist household and pastoral livelihood recovery based on documented losses and functioning markets.	Enable sustainable recovery without substituting assumed losses for verified cases.

11.1 Decision logic for assistance

Interventions should be prioritised by the life-safety value of access restoration, number and vulnerability of people affected, availability of alternatives, and practical feasibility. A bridge serving emergency health referrals may rank above a larger but redundant structure. Likewise, water-pumping restoration should precede cosmetic clearing where drinking-water availability is interrupted. Households should be classified by current shelter habitability and loss of critical assets rather than exposure alone.

11.2 Engineering design considerations

Temporary filling of eroded road approaches without restoring culvert capacity may fail during the next storm. Repairs should evaluate catchment flow paths, inlet blockage, discharge capacity, scour at foundations, subgrade saturation, edge protection and future maintenance responsibilities. Where monitoring indicates repeated overtopping, raising approaches or providing a purpose-built vented causeway may be safer than rebuilding an identical earth crossing.

12 EMISSA operational engagement and coordination

12.1 Role of the field and monitoring functions

EMISSA's field and monitoring functions provide an institutional framework for organising incident information by location, identifying priority service gaps, supporting coordination with local duty-bearers and informing targeted humanitarian action. The report is organised around field-operational questions: which communities are cut off; whether emergency services can reach them; which households lack safe accommodation; which road failures require engineering support; and which areas face renewed risk if further rainfall occurs.

12.2 Coordination priorities

- Emergency and disaster authorities: confirm rescue priorities, approved road-control decisions and engineering restrictions at each crossing.
- Health and ambulance providers: maintain a shared list of viable referral routes, functioning facilities and emergency patient transport options.
- Municipal and water authorities: identify blocked drains, pumping interruptions and priority public-service facilities requiring rapid rehabilitation.
- Camp and community representatives: identify households without adequate shelter, water, sanitation or safe access to assistance.
- Transport and market actors: assess disruptions to food and fuel deliveries and support proportionate, safe rerouting arrangements.

12.3 Evidence definitions and reporting boundaries

An "affected locality" means an area with a reported flood effect, response intervention or serious hazard warning. It is not equivalent to a polygon of confirmed inundation. A "damaged bridge" is distinct from a precautionary closure; an "out-of-service crossing" may include a temporary earth route as well as a built bridge. A "home included in response" is not necessarily destroyed, and "families departing a camp" does not measure the number of tents lost. These definitions protect the accuracy of comparisons across governorates and prevent inflation of damage totals.

Data integrity The national and Ar-Raqqa figures are retained as separate reporting series. No artificial survey sample, interview count, agricultural-hectare estimate, livestock mortality or road-repair cost has been added.

13 Strategic conclusions

The 27–29 October storm exposed a compound humanitarian problem in eastern Syria: intense flash runoff interacted with fragile or undersized crossings, low-lying displacement sites and limited service redundancy. The largest readily quantified displacement effect occurred in Ar-Raqqa, where 375 families departed three camps. Ar-Raqqa also reported concentrated bridge failures and 105 homes addressed in emergency operations. Deir ez-Zor experienced damage to wadi bridges, suspended floating crossing operations and interruptions to pumping and electricity in specific locations. Meanwhile, the Palmyra–Badia corridor demonstrated a different but equally serious life-safety exposure through wadi crossings and isolated road users.

The disaster should not be conflated with the earlier 2026 Euphrates river-level crisis: this incident was predominantly driven by storm rainfall, rapid wadi runoff and local drainage overflow. This distinction matters for project design. Rebuilding river defences alone would not resolve the exposure of desert highways to sudden upstream runoff, and urban pumping alone would not provide safe crossing infrastructure for remote routes.

A proportionate humanitarian response therefore requires parallel tracks: immediate protection of lives and displacement support, restoration of reliable essential-service access, and technically sound early recovery of vulnerable roads, culverts and drainage. In each sector, interventions should be anchored to documented needs and evolving safe-access information, with particular attention to marginalised rural settlements, camp residents, persons with disabilities, older persons and mobile pastoral households.

EMISSA's added value lies in linking a geographically precise monitoring perspective with community-centred assistance and coordination. A practical implementation strategy would prioritise the most consequential crossing and water-service bottlenecks, facilitate referrals to specialist responders, and use site-level damage records to support resilient reconstruction rather than repeated short-term repairs.